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I. INTRODUCTION
The fabled Star Wars films portray space warfare as an epic battlefield where
hundreds of fighter jets shoot lasers at adversarial jets and spaceships. 1 An example
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2021; B.A.,
Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, 2018. First, I would like to thank my family for their
unwavering support throughout my academic career. Second, I would like to thank the University of the Pacific
Law Review editors and board for their amazing assistance with this article. Last, I would like to thank Professor
Sprankling for his incredible insight in international and space law. Your guidance helped transform my general
ideas into a published article.
1. Aaron Edwards, The 17 Best Space Battles Ever Put on Screen, RANKER (June 15, 2018),
https://www.ranker.com/list/best-space-battles-in-film/aaron-edwards (on file with the University of the Pacific
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is the Death Star scene where X-wing Starfighters shoot lasers at mounted turrets
that are protecting a weapon capable of destroying planets. 2 However, today’s
technology does not meet these expectations. 3
Amidst the arms race of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan proposed the
Strategic Defense Initiative—nicknamed Star Wars—to defend against the Soviet
Union’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (“ICBM”). 4 President Reagan told the
world the Star Wars program, using land-based and space-based laser weapons,
could intercept Soviet ICBMs at various phases of the missiles’ flight. 5 To the
layman in the Cold War era, the possibility of space-based lasers seemed
fictional—something only possible in the Star Wars films. 6 However, the Soviet
Union wholeheartedly believed the United States (“U.S.”) possessed space
weaponry and intensified the arms race until its economy collapsed. 7 In December
1987, the Soviet Union and the U.S. signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(“INF”) Treaty, which required the destruction of all medium-range nuclear and
conventional missiles. 8
The INF Treaty served as a mutual disarmament between the Soviet Union and
the U.S. until Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suspended it on February 1, 2019. 9
The suspension of the INF Treaty and Russia’s reemergence as an international
superpower reignited an arms race—this time, for weapons in space. 10 Currently,
China and Russia indicate in their respective military doctrines that space is vital
to modern warfare and necessary to cripple western powers. 11 Additionally, Iran
and North Korea have showcased their ability to jam satellites, a counterspace
Law Review).
2. Id.
3. See generally Morris Jones, Star Wars: ‘Spoofing’, Anti-Satellite Weapons and Conflict in Space, THE
INTERPRETER (May 11, 2016, 10:27 AM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/star-wars-spoofing-antisatellite-weapons-and-conflict-space (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (articulating that
space weaponry available today is spoofing and cyberattacks).
4. Strategic Defense Initiative, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/StrategicDefense-Initiative (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Id.
6. See generally id. (explaining that President Reagan nicknamed the Strategic Defense Initiative “Star
Wars” to show the world that the U.S. would develop weapons in space that previously only existed in fiction
movies).
7. The Arms Race and ‘Star Wars’, CVCE, https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content//unit/55c09dcc-a9f2-45e9-b240-eaef64452cae/aeef1b65-8332-4c9c-9819-1d21617d8a8d (last visited Oct. 25,
2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id.
9. Nicole Gaouette & Jennifer Hansler, Pompeo Announces Suspension of Nuclear Arms Treaty with
Russia, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/us-russia-nuclear-arms-treatypompeo/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE (2019); see generally Power, U.S.
NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-rankings (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting Russia’s high rank in the global power ranking, signifying
Russia’s status as an international superpower).
11. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (emphasizing that Russia and China “view space as
important to modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military
effectiveness”).
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capability. 12 The race to dominate outer space militarily, like naval dominance, is
a real and current issue. 13
Recently, the U.S. joined China and Russia’s adherence to incorporating space
into its military dogma. 14 On December 20, 2019, the U.S. Space Force became
the newest branch of the military service. 15 President Donald Trump arranged the
Space Force to ensure the U.S. remains a dominant international player in space. 16
Although various nations wish to militarily dominate outer space, there are
some barriers preventing this. 17 First, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (“OST”)
prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons in outer space. 18
Second, the United Nations (“UN”) Charter forbids the use of force or threat of
use of force by one state against another. 19 However, a nation claiming self-defense
under Article 51 of the UN Charter can supersede the prohibitions of Article 2(4). 20
This Comment argues the various anti-satellite (“ASAT”) weapons the U.S.
plans to place in outer space are valid under anticipatory self-defense inherent in
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 21 Part II outlines Russia and China’s alleged space
weapon capabilities and their military plans for the future of space. 22 Part III
discusses two treaties relevant to the placement of weapons in space: the UN
Charter and the OST.23 Part IV analyzes various developing ASAT weapons
against a hypothetical scenario to determine the limits of anticipatory self-defense
under Article 51. 24 Part V recommends whether the U.S. should utilize ASAT

12. See TODD HARRISON, KAITLYN JOHNSON & THOMAS G. ROBERTS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD., SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2018, at 4 (2018) (explaining that jamming refers to “electronic attacks [that]
target the means by which space systems transmit and receive data”); DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra
note 10.
13. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
14. United States Space Force, MILITARY.COM, https://www.military.com/space-force (last visited Jan.
11, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
15. Id.
16. See Memorandum on Establishment of the United States Space Force, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOCS. 1 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policy-directive4-establishment-united-states-space-force/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting
President Trump’s mission for the Space Force is to “organize, train, and equip military space forces of the United
States to ensure unfettered access to, and freedom to operate in, space, and to provide vital capabilities to joint
and coalition forces in peacetime and across the spectrum of conflict”).
17. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
18. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 4, Dec. 19, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 119
(highlighting that the general principle in the OST is peaceful purposes of outer space).
19. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
20. Id. at art. 51.
21. See Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 UMKC L.
REV. 123, 125 (2004) (explaining that anticipatory self-defense is a nation’s right to use force against another
nation in anticipation of the latter’s use of force against the former); infra Part IV.
22. Infra Part II.
23. Infra Part III.
24. Infra Part IV.
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weapons in anticipatory self-defense today. 25
II. CHINA AND RUSSIA’S SPACE WEAPON CAPABILITIES
The U.S. has enjoyed more than twenty-five years of dominant military
successes, due in large part to space capabilities. 26 However, China and Russia are
quickly developing counterspace weapons to combat and overtake the U.S.27 China
and Russia’s increased placement of ASAT weapons on the ground and in orbit
poses a threat to the safety of the U.S.28
Around 2015, during China’s military reforms, the government integrated
space and counterspace capabilities into joint military operations—signaling its
desire to transform into a space power. 29 China’s Space White Paper in 2016
expressed the nation’s goal to “explore the vast cosmos, develop the space
industry, and build China into a space power.” 30 Currently, China employs a
number of ASAT weapons in space. 31 Additionally, the government is developing
directed energy weapons, utilizing lasers to disrupt and damage satellites. 32
China’s current and future weapons solidify it as a major space power that
threatens the U.S. 33
Unlike China, which has newly emerged as a space power, Russia is
reemerging as a dominant space power in the twenty-first century. 34 In 2018, the
Russian Defense Minister emphasized Russia’s need to meet the military
requirements of the future and explicitly referenced the need for military

25. Infra Part V.
26. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
27. See id. (showing that Russia and China aspire to overcome the U.S. militarily in space).
28. See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 16 (2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence)
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing that “China and Russia will field new
counterspace weapons intended to target US and allied space capabilities”), and Rachel S. Cohen, Russia Flexes
Space Muscle with Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, AIR FORCE MAG. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.airforcemag.com/russia-flexes-space-muscle-with-anti-satellite-weapon-test/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that Russia is not afraid to use its ASAT weapons today).
29. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
30. Id.
31. See id. (illustrating the various weapons China employs, such as: electronic warfare to jam
communication and GPS satellites; kinetic energy threats, which exist on the ground and launch missiles at Low
Earth Orbit satellites; and cyberwarfare to shut down network-based computers and intelligence).
32. Elsa B. Kania, The PLA’s Potential Breakthrough in High Power Microwave Weapons, THE DIPLOMAT
(Mar. 11, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/the-plas-potential-breakthrough-in-high-power-microwaveweapons (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
33. See Sandra Erwin, U.S. Intelligence: Russia and China Will Have ‘Operational’ Anti-Satellite Weapons
in a Few Years, SPACENEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://spacenews.com/u-s-intelligence-russia-and-china-will-haveoperational-anti-satellite-weapons-in-a-few-years/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(showing that China actively researches and develops ASAT weapons to use); HARRISON, JOHNSON & ROBERTS,
supra note 12.
34. See HARRISON, JOHNSON & ROBERTS, supra note 12 (noting that Russia reemerged in the space
industry after their bankruptcy following the Cold War).
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satellites. 35 Additionally, Russia views the U.S. as dependent on space capabilities
to carry out military operations, deeming space America’s “Achilles heel.”36
Therefore, Russia’s goal of meeting the military requirements of the future
includes the ability to neutralize U.S. space capabilities to gain military
advantages. 37
Similar to China, Russia also possesses electronic warfare (“EW”) capabilities,
kinetic energy threats, and cyberwarfare weapons. 38 However, Russia actively
utilizes its space power capabilities. 39 Between 2014 and 2017, Russia jammed
GPS signals in Ukraine, which neutralized GPS for radios, cell phones, and some
piloted aircrafts. 40 Moreover, Russia regularly employs cyberwarfare; in 2007,
Russia paralyzed Estonian online banking services, government communications,
and media outlets. 41 Furthermore, in 2016, Russia—confirmed by four U.S.
intelligence agencies in high confidence—utilized cyberwarfare and social
engineering schemes to disrupt the U.S. presidential election. 42 Russia’s
possession of space capabilities establishes it as a dominant space power once
again. 43
III. TREATIES RELEVANT TO THE PLACEMENT OF ASAT WEAPONS IN SPACE
Two treaties are directly relevant to the placement of ASAT weapons in space:
the OST and the UN Charter. 44 The OST regulates activities in outer space, such
as exploration and placement of objects. 45 The UN Charter, alternatively, governs
relations between international signatories. 46 Section A examines various
interpretations of the OST, which contemplate a nation’s ability to place ASAT
weapons in space. 47 Section B explores the UN Charter’s provisions on the
prohibition against the use of force and the right to self-defense. 48

35. See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (“The solution of this problem doubtlessly depends
directly on the availability of a modern orbital constellation of military satellites.”).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally HARRISON, JOHNSON & ROBERTS, supra note 12 (listing the times Russia used its space
power capabilities).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 18, at pmbl.; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
45. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 18, at pmbl.
46. U.N. Charter pmbl.
47. Infra Section III.A.
48. Infra Section III.B.
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A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
The OST is the governing international treaty for the use and exploration of
outer space. 49 Generally, the OST provides for cooperation among nations to
utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, including scientific and economic
development.50 To accomplish this purpose, the OST forbids the placement of
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons into earth’s orbit, on celestial
bodies, or in any other manner. 51 However, the treaty is silent on all other types of
weapons. 52
Scholars have hotly debated the meaning of the phrase “peaceful purposes” in
the OST.53 The U.S.—by definition and through its actions—takes the position that
“peaceful purposes” translates to non-aggression, rather than non-militarization.54
Therefore, under the U.S.’ position, violating a peaceful purpose under the OST
means violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 55 In support of the U.S.’
interpretation, scholars argue that military uses of satellites are not inherently nonpeaceful. 56 Opponents of the non-aggressive position contend the subjective nature
of the non-aggressive definition allows determinations based on intended use,
rather than actual capabilities of the satellites. 57 This gives nations adhering to the
non-aggressive theory free reign to place military satellites in space if the nation
articulates a non-aggressive intention for its satellite. 58
Modern technology supports the U.S.’ position.59 Today, many satellites in
outer space employed for peaceful civilian uses—like GPS and
telecommunications—would fail the non-militarization definition because these

49. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 18, at pmbl.
50. Id.
51. Id. at art. 4.
52. See generally id. (noting that the treaty only explicitly forbids nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction in space). See also INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 173 (2000) (showing that the OST only deals
with certain types of weapons).
53. DETTER, supra note 52, at 173. Compare Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant
Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 103 (2018) (arguing that
the U.S.’ interpretation is needless, wrong, and potentially noxious), with Patrick Gleeson, Legal Aspects of the
Use of Force in Space (Aug. 2005) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University) (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (“The American position was rooted in the argument that military uses are not, by
definition, non-peaceful purposes.” e.g., military satellites that are not themselves weapon systems).
54. See Gleeson, supra note 53 (clarifying that non-aggression means not in violation of Article 2(4)
whereas non-militarization means without military capabilities, e.g., banning GPS satellites).
55. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (noting that article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally forbids nations from
the use of force against another nation); see also Gleeson, supra note 53 (showing that the U.S. interpretation
begins at the interpretation of the OST).
56. Gleeson, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. See generally id. (articulating the absurdity that even nuclear weapons are peaceful if “not used for
aggressive purposes”).
59. DETTER, supra note 52, at 176.
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satellites possess military capabilities. 60 In addition, proponents of the nonmilitarization definition—like the former Soviet Union—continuously launched
military-viable satellites in space, beginning in the late 1950s with Sputnik. 61 Thus,
the non-militarization definition reveals itself as an opportunity to gain an edge in
the space race, rather than a practical and cooperative effort for peace. 62 Therefore,
the OST allows the U.S. to launch ASAT weapons into space, unless the launch
directly conflicts with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 63
B. UN Charter
Regarding the placement of ASAT weapons in space, the UN Charter contains
two relevant articles: 2(4) and 51.64 Subsection 1 discusses UN Charter Article
2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force. 65 Subsection 2 discusses a state’s
international right to self-defense under UN Charter Article 51. 66
1. UN Charter Article 2(4)—Prohibition on the Use of Force
Article 2(4) precludes nations from using force or threatening to use force. 67
Although the UN Charter generally prohibits the threat or use of force, the treaty
does not define what constitutes a use of force. 68
Some scholars argue that demonstrations of force fall into the threat of force
restriction under Article 2(4). 69 An example of a demonstration of force that
violated Article 2(4) occurred in the 1994 Iraq–Kuwait tensions. 70 In early October
1994, Iraq sent an estimated 70,000 troops and 700 tanks to its southern border in
close proximity to Kuwait. 71 Further, Iraq denied Kuwait’s sovereignty and

60. See Elizabeth Howell, Navstar: GPS Satellite Network, SPACE.COM (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.space.com/19794navstar.html#targetText=Navstar%20is%20a%20network%20of,signal%20from%20each%20individual%20sat
ellite (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that GPS possesses uses for military
and civilian purposes); DETTER, supra note 52, at 176.
61. Gleeson, supra note 53.
62. See generally id. (arguing that Russia is trying to capitalize on the vague non-militarization definition).
63. Id.
64. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, art. 51.
65. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4; infra Subsection III.A.1.
66. U.N. Charter art. 51; infra Subsection III.B.2.
67. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
68. See generally id. (noting the lack of a definition for the use of force).
69. See NIKOLAS STURCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (2007) (classifying
demonstrations of force as a threat of force; S.C. Res. 949, ¶¶ 1–2 (Oct. 15, 1994) (characterizing Iraq’s military
deployments as a threat of force, even though they are demonstrations of force).
70. STURCHLER, supra note 69, at 206, 209.
71. Id.
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continually referred to Kuwait as Iraq’s nineteenth province. 72 Although Iraq
insisted it had no intention to invade Kuwait, many countries around the world had
no faith in Iraq. 73 On October 15th, approximately one week after Kuwait notified
the UN Security Council of Iraq’s troop deployment, the Security Council passed
Resolution 949.74 The Resolution asserted that “the presence of Iraqi troops
amounted to a threat of force in violation of the UN Charter.” 75
The UN’s passage and ratification of Resolution 949 solidified the
classification of demonstrations of force as potential threats of force. 76 In other
words, demonstrations of force may constitute a breach of Article 2(4) and
potentially allow a nation to retaliate in self-defense under Article 51. 77 However,
a nation’s ability to respond to a demonstration of force in self-defense under
Article 51 depends on the interpretation of Article 51. 78
2. UN Charter Article 51—The Right to Self-Defense
Article 51 of the UN Charter allows State A to engage in self-defense against
State B if State B initiated an armed attack against State A. 79 However, customary
international law takes a different approach to a state’s inherent right to selfdefense. 80 Subsection a discusses the traditional approach to interpreting Article
51.81 Subsection b explores the customary international law approach to
interpreting Article 51. 82

72. Id. at 207.
73. Id. at 207–08.
74. S.C. Res. 949, supra note 69, at ¶ 4; see also STURCHLER, supra note 69, at 208 (clarifying that
Resolution 949 was “sponsored by Argentina, France, Oman, Rwanda, the UK, and the USA”).
75. STURCHLER, supra note 69, at 209.
76. See S.C. Res. 949, supra note 69, at ¶ 3 (declaring that a demonstration of force can violate U.N. Charter
Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force); see also STURCHLER, supra note 69, at 209 (explaining why
demonstrations of force may breach the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force).
77. U.N. Charter art. 51.
78. DETTER, supra note 52, at 173.
79. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”). See also
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 (Dec. 14, 1974) (delineating concrete examples of armed attacks).
80. Martinez, supra note 21, at 134–35.
81. Infra Subsection III.B.2.a.
82. Infra Subsection III.B.2.b.
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a. Traditional Approach to Interpreting Article 51 of the UN Charter
The traditional approach to interpreting Article 51 of the UN Charter involves
a plain meaning reading of the Article—allowing self-defense only after an armed
attack occurs. 83 This approach adheres to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties because the UN Charter’s purpose is to prevent war and promote peace. 84
Adherents to this view argue the necessity of an armed attack to claim self-defense
is a narrow, yet logical, reading of the Article. 85 Additionally, proponents worry a
broader reading of Article 51 would allow states to abuse their discretion in
invoking self-defense. 86 Moreover, the traditional approach furthers the UN
Charter’s peace objective because it prevents states from claiming small-scale
infractions that trigger Article 51’s right to self-defense. 87 Despite the support for
a strict interpretation of Article 51, other scholars view the narrow approach as too
restrictive and in conflict with prior customary law. 88
b. Customary International Law Approach to Interpreting Article 51 of
the UN Charter
The customary international law approach to interpreting Article 51 recognizes
a nation’s preexisting right to anticipatory self-defense—expanding the traditional
view of self-defense. 89 Anticipatory self-defense is Nation A’s use of force against
Nation B before Nation B used forced against Nation A. 90 The justification for
anticipatory self-defense lies in the holding of the Caroline affair. 91
During a Canadian uprising against the British government in 1837, rebels
looted a U.S. arsenal to steal arms and ammunition. 92 However, the U.S. took
measures to ensure its army did not breach any duty to the British for the rebels
stealing arms. 93 Throughout the insurrection, Caroline—an American ship—
supplied rebels in Canada with provisions and reinforcements from ports within

83. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (noting the requirement of an armed attack to occur before responding with
self-defense).
84. See id. at pmbl. (stressing the importance of international peace); see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (explaining that article 31 requires interpreting treaties
according to their ordinary meaning).
85. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 118 (3d ed. 2008).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 69,
75, 78 (2003).
90. See id. at 72 (defining anticipatory self-defense as “the use of force by a state to repel an attacker before
an actual attack has taken place, before the army of the enemy has crossed the border, and before the bombs of
the enemy fall upon its territory”).
91. Id. at 95.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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the U.S.94 When the British found the Caroline on U.S. soil, a British band
destroyed the Caroline by cutting its anchor so the boat floated over the Niagara
Falls. 95 The British responded to ensuing American protests by citing self-defense
as justification for destroying the Caroline. 96 Secretary of State Daniel Webster
exchanged diplomatic letters with the British government regarding the Caroline
incident and explained the elements required for Britain to justify their actions. 97
His letter contained three elements for anticipatory self-defense: imminence,
necessity, and proportionality. 98 This definition created a right to self-defense of
preventive action without the requirement of an actual armed attack. 99 Despite the
three requirements set out in Caroline, there is disagreement among scholars
regarding each definition. 100
Caroline sets out that an imminent anticipatory self-defense act requires a
nation to act in an instant, “leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”101 Yet a mere mobilization of troops does not trigger an imminent
response—a nation must mobilize its troops or arms and have hostile intent.102
Thus, prior to Nation A acting preemptively, it must show that Nation B
subjectively intends to strike and objectively possesses the means to do so. 103
The necessity and imminence factors overlap significantly, as necessity often
relies on the imminence of an attack. 104 Specifically, necessity looks towards the
intention of the adversarial nation and that nation’s probability of attacking.105
Moreover, similar to imminence, evaluating necessity begins at the start of the
conflict. 106 Therefore, a nation’s act in anticipatory self-defense is necessary when
it protects against an imminent threat of attack from an adversarial nation. 107
Under anticipatory self-defense, “an action is proportional when it is necessary
to end and to repulse an attack, not just when it corresponds exactly to the acts of

94. Id.
95. Van den hole, supra note 89, at 95.
96. Id. at 96.
97. See id. (“It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”).
98. Id. at 96–97.
99. Id. at 97.
100. See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, “Don’t Tread on Us”: International Law and Forcible
State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 196–200 (1994) (illustrating the multitude of differing
scholarly views on each of the Caroline elements), and Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal
Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1083–85 (2004) (highlighting
that no formal definitions exist for the Caroline elements).
101. Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96.
102. See Martinez, supra note 21, at 170 (showing that Nation A can infer hostile intent from Nation B
through previous acts of aggression).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 169–70.
105. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1635 (1984).
106. Gina Heathcote, Article 51 Self-Defense as a Narrative: Spectators and Heroes in International Law,
12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 137 (2006).
107. Martinez, supra note 21, at 169–70.
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aggression.” 108 Further, the anticipatory action must not exceed in scope the action
prompting the anticipatory action. 109 Consequently, the proportionality of an
anticipatory act relies on the reasonableness of the action. 110
This Comment uses the three elements of anticipatory self-defense to test the
legality of the U.S. placing certain ASAT weapons in space today. 111 However, for
customary international law to become binding legal precedent, a nation claiming
the international custom must show two requirements: opinio juris and state
practice. 112 Subsection i defines opinio juris’ requirements. 113 Subsection ii
provides examples of nations utilizing anticipatory self-defense to justify their use
of force. 114
i. Opinio Juris
Opinio juris is the subjective element inherent in international customary
law. 115 It is the belief that a nation can legally conduct a particular act or practice.116
Without the subjective belief that a nation adheres to opinio juris when carrying
out an act, any claims of customary international law fail. 117 Yet if a nation
successfully articulates opinio juris, it still must show state practice that confirms
its opinio juris. 118
ii. Examples of State-Sponsored Anticipatory Self-Defense
The second requirement to show an action conforms to customary international
law is state practice of similar conduct. 119 Although the theory of anticipatory selfdefense has existed since the 1800s, nations have not routinely invoked it to justify
their actions. 120 However, there are a few key events where nations have invoked
108. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the
Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 97 (1991).
109. Schachter, supra note 105, at 1637.
110. Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine
and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 170
n.78 (2002).
111. Infra Part IV.
112. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at art. 38; Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
113. Infra Subsection III.B.2.a.i.
114. Infra Subsection III.B.2.a.ii.
115. Jo Lynn Slama, Note, Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603,
648 (1991).
116. Id. at 649.
117. Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and
the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 189, 194 (2015).
118. Slama, supra note 115, at 656.
119. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 112, at art. 38, ¶ 1.
120. See generally Martinez, supra note 21, at 127, 131 (noting that many nations do not rely on
anticipatory self-defense to justify their actions).
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anticipatory self-defense with varying acceptance by the international
community. 121
The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was a momentous event where the U.S.
relied on anticipatory self-defense to justify its actions. 122 To stop the transfer of
Soviet missiles to Cuba, the U.S. instituted a “defensive quarantine” against Cuba,
violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 123 To justify the quarantine, the U.S.
argued its actions were necessary to preempt an attack by Cuba.124 Further, the
U.S. articulated the potential imminence of a Cuban attack with the transported
weapons due to Cuba’s allies, threatening statements, and proximity to the U.S.125
Last, the quarantine was proportional to the transportation of nuclear weapons
because the quarantine repulsed Cuba’s attack without exceeding the scope of
Cuba’s intentions. 126 Despite the U.S.’ arguments, the international community did
not reach a conclusion on whether the U.S. met the requirements for anticipatory
self-defense. 127
Another famous example of anticipatory self-defense is the Six-Day War,
which began in 1967. 128 Before the war started, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser failed to aid Syria and Jordan against Israel—which sparked criticism of
his actions. 129 In addition, Nasser hid behind the United Nations Emergency Force
(“UNEF”), which protected the Egyptian–Israeli border. 130 In spite of the previous
lack of support for Syria, Nasser began to fully support Syria through multiple acts
in May 1967.131 He moved Egyptian troops to the Sinai, formally requested the
UN to remove their UNEF, and closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israelis. 132
Subsequently, Nasser signed a joint defense pact with Jordan and Iraq that allowed
Nasser to control Jordanian and Iraqi troops. 133

121. See generally id. at 136–41 (highlighting the times nations relied on anticipatory self-defense to justify
their preemptive actions).
122. Alex Potcovaru, The International Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense and U.S. Options in North Korea,
LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2017, 1:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-anticipatory-self-defenseand-us-options-north-korea (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
123. See generally Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VIL. L. REV. 699, 713
(2005) (noting that a defensive quarantine constitutes a use of force and is in violation of 2(4), prompting a selfdefense justification for using the force); Potcovaru, supra note 122.
124. Potcovaru, supra note 122.
125. Paul Halsall, Modern History Sourcebook: United Nations: Cuban Missile Crisis Debate, 1962,
FORDHAM U. (July 1998), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1962-cuba-un1.asp (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
126. See generally id. (noting that a quarantine of arms is less dangerous than utilizing nuclear weapons).
127. See Potcovaru, supra note 122 (clarifying that the U.N. never reached a formal conclusion regarding
the Cuban Missile Crisis because the U.S. resolved the issue through diplomatic channels).
128. Six-Day War, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War (last
visited Mar. 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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In response to the sudden mobilization of Egypt, Israel launched a preemptive
attack on June 5, 1967, that destroyed more than 90% of Egypt’s Air Force.134
Citing their actions as defensive and legally justified, Israel argued the preemptive
strike was necessary to defeat the Egyptian coalition before it attacked first. 135
Additionally, Israel emphasized the imminence element of anticipatory selfdefense because Egypt encircled Israel, which led to a disruption of the decadelong status quo of stability. 136 Further, Israel’s preemptive attack that destroyed
Egypt’s Air Force was proportional because Egypt’s previous actions indicated it
wished to destroy Israel’s army. 137 Although scholars differed on Israel’s
anticipatory self-defense justification, the UN Security Council did not expressly
condemn Israel for its preemptive attack in self-defense. 138
An example where a nation relied entirely on anticipatory self-defense is
Israel’s bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.139 Israel bombed a partially
constructed Iraqi nuclear reactor because Israel claimed Iraq built the reactor to
construct nuclear weapons, which endangered Israeli citizens. 140 Israel’s
justification for bombing the nuclear reactor relied on the necessity of a potentially
lost opportunity—if Iraq completed the construction, destroying a live reactor
would emit nuclear fallout. 141 Ultimately, the international community
unanimously condemned Israel’s actions because Israel did not meet the Caroline
requirements. 142 First, Israel’s anticipatory self-defense claim lacks the
proportionality element because its destruction of the nuclear reactor did not
repulse an attack. 143 Rather, Israel claimed Iraq planned on attacking Israel without
any definitive proof, and subsequent findings showed Iraq fully complied with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 144 Next, Israel conceded that it spent months planning
the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor. 145 Based on this timeframe, Israel’s claim
must fail. 146 Anticipatory self-defense’s element of imminence requires a nation to
134. Id.
135. Potcovaru, supra note 122; U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 155, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (June
6, 1967).
136. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 135, at 155.
137. Id.; see also supra Subsection III.B.2. (reiterating that demonstrations of force can violate Article
2(4)).
138. Martinez, supra note 21, at 138.
139. Id. at 139.
140.
On This Day, June 7, 1981: Israel Bombs Baghdad Nuclear Reactor, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
141. Potcovaru, supra note 122.
142. S.C. Res 487, ¶ 1 (June 19, 1981); Martinez, supra note 21, at 139–40.
143. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282d mtg. at 48–53, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2282 (June 15, 1981).
144. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., Dec. 11, 1969, 33 U.S.T. 1792, 634
U.N.T.S. 362 (showing that the treaty prevents the construction of nuclear weapons); see also U.N. SCOR, 36th
Sess., 2282d mtg., supra note 143, at 48–53 (highlighting Israel’s allegations).
145. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282d mtg., supra note 143, at 16.
146. See id. (stressing that the multiplicity of months that went into Israel’s plan of bombing Iraq’s nuclear
reactor are inconsistent with the elements of anticipatory self-defense).
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act without a “moment for deliberation.”147 Thus, the months of advanced planning
negated Israel’s anticipatory self-defense claim. 148
Another example of the U.S. justifying its actions through anticipatory selfdefense occurred in 1986 when President Reagan ordered airstrikes on Libyan
military targets. 149 President Reagan relied primarily on a traditional Article 51
self-defense theory because Libya bombed airports in Rome and Vienna in
December 1985. 150 However, he also cited anticipatory self-defense as a means to
prevent future Libyan terrorist attacks. 151 The White House released a
memorandum regarding its concern about future Libyan attacks and explained the
U.S.’ justification for its bombing.152 Similar to the previous examples, the
international community was upset about the application of the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense rather than the existence of it. 153 The UN General
Assembly’s resolution contained seventy-nine votes that censured the U.S.’
action. 154 Scholars criticized the U.S.’ airstrike as failing to meet the
proportionality and imminence requirements of anticipatory self-defense. 155 To
meet the proportionality element, the U.S. needed to have evidence that Libya was
intending to conduct a grievous airstrike that intended to cause mass casualties. 156
Moreover, the U.S. did not articulate any concrete imminent attacks from Libya;
rather, it relied on unknown, potential attacks in the future. 157 Due to the U.S.’
failure to establish the required elements of anticipatory self-defense, its claim was
unsuccessful. 158
The U.S. again cited anticipatory self-defense for its actions in a terrorist
matter when the military launched twenty-three missiles on Iraqi intelligence
forces in 1993. 159 President Clinton claimed the missiles were necessary to
147. Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96 (2003).
148. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282d mtg., supra note 143, at 16.
149. Martinez, supra note 21, at 140; see also Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb.
22, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/22/magazine/target-qaddafi.html (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (highlighting that the U.S. airstrike killed more than 100 people).
150. Martinez, supra note 21, at 140.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 140–41 (“[I]n light of this reprehensible [Libyan] act of violence and clear evidence that
Libya is planning future attacks, the United States has chosen to exercise its right of self-defense. It is our hope
that [U.S.] action will preempt and discourage Libyan attacks on innocent civilians in the future.”).
153. Id. at 141.
154. Id.
155. See Bonafede, supra note 110, at 175 (denouncing the U.S.’ anticipatory self-defense claim based on
a lack of proportionality); see also John Quigley, The New World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSE J.
INT’L. L. & COMM. 75, 106 (1992) (failing to find the imminence requirement for the U.S.’ airstrike against
Libya).
156. Bonafede, supra note 110, at 175.
157. Quigley, supra note 155, at 106; Hersh, supra note 149 (noting that President Reagan relied on
unknown future attacks without any specific examples).
158. G.A. Res. 41/38, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 1986).
159. Martinez, supra note 21, at 142; see also Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination Attempts
Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill
George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569, 604–05 (1995) (highlighting that the missiles “kill[ed] eight people,
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neutralize an Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush
while he visited Kuwait. 160 In essence, President Clinton attempted to “reduce
[Iraq’s] ability to promote terrorism [and] deter further acts of aggression against
the U.S.”161 In the aftermath, neither the UN Security Council nor the General
Assembly passed a resolution condemning the U.S.’ actions. 162 In this matter, the
U.S. likely asserted a successful anticipatory self-defense claim. 163 Although Iraq
already conducted an unsuccessful assassination attempt on President H. W. Bush,
the agency responsible (i.e., the Iraqi Intelligence Service) remained free;
therefore, Iraq could have imminently attempted another assassination. 164 The
missile strike was necessary because it targeted the Iraqi Intelligence Service
responsible for the assassination attempt, eliminating the possibility of a future
assassination attempt. 165 Finally, the U.S. satisfied the proportionality requirement
because it narrowly focused on the agency responsible for the assassination attempt
and limited its response to military targets. 166
For the third time, the U.S. responded to a terrorist attack by justifying its
actions through Article 51 self-defense and anticipatory self-defense. 167 In 1998,
bombs exploded outside of U.S. embassies in two African countries. 168 These
attacks killed more than 300 people and injured over 4,500 others. 169 Thereafter,
the U.S. military launched seventy-nine missiles against Osama bin Laden’s
outposts in Sudan and Afghanistan. 170 The imminence of an attack against the U.S.
was high because the targets of the airstrike were a terrorist training camp and a
pharmaceutical plant—dangerous locations warranting an immediate response.171
This situation is unlike Israel’s failed imminence claim because Israel had time to

and wound[ed] at least twelve people”).
160. Martinez, supra note 21, at 142.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Teplitz, supra note 159, at 612 (finding that the U.S. met the elements of anticipatory selfdefense); see also Martinez, supra note 21, at 142 (finding that China was the only nation to publicly criticize the
1993 U.S. missile strikes in Iraq).
164. Teplitz, supra note 159, at 610. But see Martinez, supra note 21, at 142 (arguing there was no
imminent attack).
165. Teplitz, supra note 159, at 611.
166. See id. at 597–99, 612 (postulating that although assassinating Saddam Hussein would have been
equally proportional, such attempts on individual lives are in violation of domestic and international law).
167. Martinez, supra note 21, at 143.
168. See id. (noting that the embassies were in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).
169. Id.
170. See Bonafede, supra note 110, at 178 (clarifying that the U.S. launched missiles at “[Osama] bin
Laden’s terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant”); Martinez, supra note 21,
at 143; see also James Risen, Question of Evidence: A Special Report.; To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year
Later, Debates Rankle, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/27/world/questionevidence-special-report-bomb-sudan-plant-not-year-later-debates-rankle.html (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (observing that the pharmaceutical plant was likely producing nerve gas).
171. See Campbell, supra note 100, at 1085, 1093 (describing the three elements of modern anticipatory
self-defense claims).
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deliberate and had no evidence of an imminent attack. 172 Bombing the two
locations was necessary because the U.S. had evidence that future attacks were
probable from the two facilities, necessitating an anticipatory attack to protect
Americans. 173 The U.S.’ response was proportionate because the strike resulted in
only twenty-one deaths—much less than the over 250 deaths from the embassy
bombings.174 However, this time the UN Security Council never evaluated the
U.S.’ action. 175 Further, the international reaction was generally supportive of the
U.S. strike, unlike previous attempts by the U.S. to use anticipatory self-defense. 176
In September 2002, President George W. Bush delivered a speech to the UN
suggesting the U.S. would rely on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense against
Iraq. 177 Additionally, the common theme in President Bush speeches was the threat
of Saddam Hussein, solidifying Iraq as a potentially imminent threat. 178 Finally,
the U.S. cemented its stance on anticipatory self-defense in a document titled “The
National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 179 This document
reinforced the U.S.’ position that it will “exercise [the] right of self-defense by
acting preemptively” on terrorist organizations. 180 The sentiment of relying on
anticipatory self-defense did not waver in future administrations. 181 Even the
Trump administration—almost sixty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis—
embodied the notion that anticipatory self-defense is a valid and accepted rule in
international law. 182
Through the U.S.’ actions and beliefs, it likely satisfies the requirements to
ensure the customary international law of anticipatory self-defense becomes
binding.183 First, the U.S. possesses opinio juris because it subjectively believes
172. Cf. Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 20, 1998 from the Permanent Rep. of
the United States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S.C. Doc S/1998/780
(Aug. 20, 1998) (showing the U.S. had knowledge that future attacks were imminent).
173. Id.
174. James McIntyre & Andrea Koppel, U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, CNN (Aug.
21, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
175. Martinez, supra note 21, at 143.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 149–51 (showing the multiplicity of statements President George W. Bush made regarding
anticipatory self-defense or its elements).
178. See id. (highlighting President Bush’s language regarding Iraq and Saddam Hussein).
179. See Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass
Destruction, WHITE HOUSE, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that President Bush willingly
advocated for the use of anticipatory self-defense); Martinez, supra note 21, at 149–51.
180. Martinez, supra note 21, at 152.
181. See Jack Goldsmith, Obama Has Officially Adopted Bush’s Iraq Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016, 1:20
PM), https://time.com/4283865/obama-adopted-bushs-iraq-doctrine/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (showing President Obama relied on anticipatory self-defense).
182. See Louis Rene Beres, America, Iran, and “Anticipatory Self-Defense”: International Legal
Standards
of
Presidential
War-Making
Decision,
JURIST
(July
5,
2019),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/07/louis-beres-anticipatory-self-defense/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (showing President Trump relied on anticipatory self-defense).
183. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 112, at art. 38, ¶ 1; see Martinez, supra note
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anticipatory self-defense is valid law and follows it as such. 184 Moreover, the U.S.
repeatedly justifies its state practice with citations to anticipatory self-defense,
showing its adherence to the customary international law. 185 Finally, other nations
also adhere to the opinio juris and state practice of anticipatory self-defense,
lending credit towards its acceptance as binding, customary international law. 186
IV. TESTING U.S. ASAT WEAPONS AGAINST ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
Using the elements of anticipatory self-defense, this Comment poses a
hypothetical situation to analyze the legality of various U.S. ASAT weapons.187
Hypothetical nation “Alliance” currently employs a four-person inhabited base
camp in space, located on the moon. 188 The inhabited base camp contains an
antenna protruding from its roof with the capability to shoot a laser that
permanently destroys adversarial GPS satellites. 189 The U.S. received credible
information that Alliance planned to destroy an American GPS satellite tomorrow
morning to antagonize American citizens. 190 Relying on this information, the U.S.
intends to take preemptive actions in anticipatory self-defense to protect its
citizens. 191
Based on the hypothetical scenario above, this Comment tests the legality of
various ASAT weapons against anticipatory self-defense under international
customary law. 192 Because the hypothetical’s facts show that the U.S. possesses
credible information of Alliance’s imminent attack, most of the weapon analysis

21, at 157 (highlighting examples where the U.S. satisfies the requirements for customary international law of
anticipatory self-defense).
184. Slama, supra note 115, at 649.
185. See Martinez, supra note 21, at 136–53 (noting that the U.S. justifies their actions with anticipatory
self-defense often).
186. See generally id. at 136 (observing examples of other nations justifying actions with anticipatory selfdefense).
187. See generally supra Subsection III.B.2.b (explaining that the hypothetical will utilize the Caroline
elements to test whether certain weapons are applicable in a fictitious situation).
188. See generally Meghan Bartels, NASA Unveils Plan for Artemis ‘Base Camp’ on the Moon Beyond
2024, SPACE.COM (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.space.com/nasa-plans-artemis-moon-base-beyond2024.html#xenforo-comments-30351 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that
NASA plans to build a lunar base camp within the next decade which this Comment will use as a model for the
hypothetical).
189. See generally China May Deploy Anti-Satellite Laser Weapons Next Year Able to Destroy U.S.
Military
Satellites,
MIL.
&
AEROSPACE
ELECTRONICS
(Feb.
18,
2019),
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/trusted-computing/article/16711585/china-may-deploy-antisatellite-laserweapons-next-year-able-to-destroy-us-military-satellites (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing a laser weapon that China allegedly possesses which this Comment will use as part of its hypothetical).
190. See generally supra Subsection III.B.2.b (utilizing the date of the attack as “tomorrow” to allow for
an imminence and necessity analysis).
191. See generally Subsection III.B.2.b (debating whether the U.S.’ preemptive action will satisfy the
Caroline elements depending on the ASAT weapon employed).
192. Supra Part II.
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will focus on the fact-specific inquiry of proportionality. 193 Section A discusses
the legality of kinetic kill vehicles. 194 Section B explores the legality of
radiofrequency jammers. 195 Section C examines the legality of chemical
sprayers. 196 Section D analyzes the legality of high-power microwaves. 197 Section
E reviews the legality of robotic mechanisms. 198
A. Kinetic Kill Vehicles
Kinetic kill vehicles seek and destroy long-range ballistic missiles while the
missiles are still in space. 199 The vehicles use the force of the collision to destroy
satellites and missiles, rather than warheads or explosives. 200 However, these
vehicles also have the potential to destroy satellites if the operator chooses to do
so. 201 In essence, kinetic kill vehicles permanently destroy adversarial missiles and
satellites. 202
If the U.S. acted preemptively and utilized a kinetic kill vehicle to thwart
Alliance’s plan, it would satisfy the imminence requirement because Alliance
intends to attack tomorrow. 203 Additionally, Alliance objectively possesses the
means to carry out the attack with its laser antenna. 204 Alliance’s plan also
necessitates a preemptive action from the U.S. because it is necessary for the U.S.
to protect its citizens from hostile attacks. 205 However, the permanent and
destructive nature of a kinetic kill vehicle’s damage requires a high degree of
proportionality. 206 If the U.S. deployed a kinetic kill vehicle towards Alliance’s
base camp, the collision would destroy the base camp and result in the death of
any inhabitants. 207 On the other hand, if Alliance succeeded in its mission to

193. See generally Subsection III.B.2.b (highlighting the examples of state practice where meeting
proportionality depended on specific facts).
194. Infra Section IV.A.
195. Infra Section IV.B.
196. Infra Section IV.C.
197. Infra Section IV.D.
198. Infra Section IV.E.
199.
First Line of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, RAYTHEON MISSILES & DEF.,
https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/ekv (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
200. Id.
201. See id. (clarifying that colliding a kill vehicle into a satellite will destroy the satellite).
202. Id.
203. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b (arguing that Alliance’s plan to attack the satellite tomorrow leaves
the U.S. no choice but to preemptively attack).
204. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b (arguing that Alliance’s possession of the laser antenna helps satisfy
the imminence requirement).
205. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b (determining that the U.S. satisfies the necessity requirement because
its preemptive action will deter Alliance’s attack).
206. First Line of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, supra note 199; see also supra Subsection III.B.2
(noting that proportionality requires the preemptive attack not to exceed the scope of the threatened attack).
207. See Rob Ludacer & David Anderson, Here’s How Long Humans Could Survive in Space Without a

750

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
destroy a U.S. GPS satellite, no American citizens would immediately die. 208
However, emergency services—without the access to GPS—may arrive late to a
time sensitive life-or-death situation and result in an individual’s death. 209 This
proportionality situation is similar to Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor: It
relies on the unforeseen potential of future deaths, which the UN rejected. 210 Like
Israel, the U.S.’ proportionality claim for the kinetic kill vehicle must fail. 211 Thus,
although the U.S. meets the imminence and necessity elements of Caroline, the
kinetic kill vehicle’s lack of proportionality in this situation forbids its use. 212
B. Radiofrequency Jammers
Radiofrequency jammers interfere with the communications to and from
satellites. 213 Unlike kinetic kill vehicles, jamming does not permanently or
physically alter adversarial satellites. 214 When a radiofrequency jammer cuts off
satellite communication, the functions of the satellite are unavailable (e.g., a phone
will not receive GPS signals to use Google Maps). 215 Due to the non-permanent
nature of radiofrequency jammers, the anticipatory self-defense elements will
require less intense facts than kinetic kill vehicles. 216
Jamming Alliance’s laser antenna capabilities satisfies the imminence
requirement because the U.S. must act without hesitation to prevent a large-scale
GPS shutdown. 217 Further, it would be necessary to jam Alliance’s laser antenna
because without the GPS satellites, the U.S. would be vulnerable to Alliance’s

Spacesuit, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-long-human-surviveouter-space-without-spacesuit-2017-5 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that a
human will only survive for 90 seconds in space without adequate protection).
208. See generally Top Time-Sensitive Medical Emergencies, ALTUS EMERGENCY CTRS.,
https://www.altusemergency.com/top-time-sensitive-medical-emergencies/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing examples of time-sensitive emergencies that, although
serious, are nonetheless not immediately fatal).
209. See id. (providing examples of time-sensitive medical emergencies such as “heart attacks, strokes,
and severe trauma”).
210. See generally Martinez, supra note 21, at 139–40 (arguing that Israel’s failed attempt to invoke
anticipatory self-defense was due to the reliance on unforeseen events).
211. See supra Subsection III.B.2 (demonstrating that neither country met the Caroline requirement of
proportionality).
212. See supra Subsection III.B.2 (requiring that a country justifying its action through anticipatory selfdefense must meet all the Caroline requirements).
213. Pavel Velkovsky, Janani Mohan & Maxwell Simon, Satellite Jamming, ON THE RADAR (April 3,
2019), https://ontheradar.csis.org/issue-briefs/satellite-jamming/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see also supra Subsection III.B.2 (noting that proportionality without the loss of lives simplifies
the equation).
217. See generally Velkovsky, Mohan & Simon, supra note 213 (explaining how a radiofrequency jammer
disrupts satellites).
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planned attack. 218 Next, jamming the antenna is proportional because it repulses
Alliance’s attack without exceeding the scope of Alliance’s plan. 219 Utilizing the
radiofrequency jammer against Alliance’s laser antenna targeting mechanism is
the preferable choice of all the weapons because it prevents Alliance from acting
at the least cost to Alliance. 220 Although Alliance’s base camp may lose radio
signals or power during the jamming, this loss will not result in any imminent harm
to the inhabitants. 221 Repelling an attack on a GPS satellite is a situation where the
U.S. could use a radiofrequency jammer in anticipatory self-defense since the
weapon complies with Caroline’s elements. 222
C. Chemical Sprayers
Although nations have not revealed specifics about chemical sprayer ASAT
weapons, many authors speculate that space powers possess the technology
already. 223 Since engineers commonly use aluminum to build satellites, chemical
sprayers probably utilize chemicals like gallium to severely weaken the
aluminum’s structure. 224 Once the satellite’s structure breaks down, it likely cannot
survive the extreme conditions of outer space and will disintegrate. 225
If the U.S. chemically sprayed Alliance’s laser antenna, a problem may arise
with the imminence element because the antenna will take time to break down

218. See generally Thuy Mai, Global Positioning System History, NASA (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS_History.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that GPS is essential for national defense).
219. See generally Velkovsky, Mohan & Simon, supra note 213 (explaining the effects of radiofrequency
jamming).
220. See generally id. (illustrating how radiofrequency jammers can disrupt adversarial technology without
physically destroying anything).
221. See Loren Grush, NASA is Working on a Partial Power Outage on the Space Station That’s Delaying
a SpaceX Launch, THE VERGE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/30/18523864/nasainternational-space-station-spacex-power-channel (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(showing that the International Space Station can operate without power for a limited time).
222. See Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96–97 (exploring the Caroline elements for anticipatory selfdefense); see also Velkovsky, Mohan & Simon, supra note 213 (showing the minimal permanent effects of
radiofrequency jamming).
223. Bill Gertz, Pentagon: Chinese Military Units Training With ASAT Missiles, WASH. FREE BEACON
(Jan. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-chinese-military-units-trainingwith-asat-missiles/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Brett Tingley, Pentagon Report Says
China’s Cleaner Satellites Are Actually Killer Satellites, MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://mysteriousuniverse.org/2019/02/pentagon-report-says-chinas-cleaner-satellites-are-actually-killersatellites/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
224. See Gallium v Aluminum, ROYAL INSTITUTION, https://www.rigb.org/ri-videos/gallium-v-aluminium
(last visited Jan. 12, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the chemical
reaction between gallium and aluminum results in the aluminum becoming brittle).
225. See generally id. (showing that brittle aluminum cannot withstand normal manufacturing wear and
tear). See also MIRIA M. FINCKENOR & KIM K. DE GROH, NASA, SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS,
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NP-2015-03-015-JSC_Space_Environment-ISS-Mini-Book-2015508.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the extreme
conditions in space).
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from the gallium. 226 Nevertheless, President Kennedy’s quarantine of Soviet arms
during the Cuban Missile Crisis satisfied the imminence requirement even though
the affair lasted thirteen days. 227 Since the chemical sprayer is a similar timeframe
to the quarantine, it would likely meet the imminence requirement. 228 Spraying
Alliance’s laser antenna is necessary because it would thwart Alliance’s plan to
destroy a U.S. GPS satellite. 229 Further, weakening the structure of Alliance’s
antenna is proportionate because the destruction of the laser antenna repulses the
attack and does not go beyond Alliance’s scope of attack. 230 However, if the U.S.
decided to use the chemical sprayer, it would need to exercise caution to ensure
the gallium only attached to the antenna. 231 If the sprayer missed and sprayed
gallium on the inhabited base, the gallium could wither away the base’s structure
and cause the inhabitants to die. 232 If the inhabitants died, the U.S. would not
satisfy the proportionality element because killing four people goes beyond the
scope of destroying a GPS satellite. 233 Accordingly, the U.S. should either exercise
extreme caution if it decides to use a chemical sprayer or opt for utilizing a
radiofrequency jammer instead. 234
D. High-Power Microwaves
High-power microwave (“HPM”) ASAT weapons emit small-range, short
pulses of microwave radiation at their target. 235 The effects of an HPM range from
temporary disablement of computers to permanent burnout of systems not
equipped with shields to protect against high electromagnetic fields. 236 Therefore,
226. See Gallium v Aluminum, supra note 224 (demonstrating that gallium-infused aluminum breaks down
over time); see also Finckenor & de Groh, supra note 225 (reiterating the extreme conditions in space that may
expedite the process of the aluminum deteriorating).
227. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b (arguing that the thirteen-day quarantine satisfied the imminence
requirement because of the transfer time of the arms).
228. See Gallium v Aluminum, supra note 224 (showing the speed at which gallium deteriorates
aluminum); see also supra Subsection III.B.2. (highlighting the similarity in time between the previously
discussed quarantine and the deteriorated aluminum).
229. See generally Gallium v Aluminum, supra note 224 (maintaining that a gallium-infused aluminum
antenna will not function because of the chemical reaction between gallium and aluminum).
230. See supra Part III.B.2 (determining that destroying an antenna is equivalent to destroying a satellite).
231. See generally Gallium v Aluminum, supra note 224 (demonstrating that liquid gallium can drip down
the aluminum target).
232. See Ludacer & Anderson, supra note 207 (reiterating that humans cannot last long in space without
protection).
233. See Bonafede, supra note 110, at 175 (analyzing the proportionality element, which requires more
than property damage to justify taking a human life).
234. See Subsection III.B.2 (arguing that the safer option is to utilize a radiofrequency jammer because its
likelihood to meet the proportionality requirement is greater).
235. See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45098, U.S. ARMY WEAPONS-RELATED
DIRECTED ENERGY (DE) PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 26 (2018)
(explaining that equipping a satellite with certain materials can form a shield to protect it from HPM ASAT
weapons).
236. Id.
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the viability of HPMs relies on the protection of the adversarial satellite.237
Although U.S. researchers are skeptical about the viability of HPM ASAT
weapons, Chinese scientists allegedly achieved success in developing this type of
weapon.238
The U.S.’ use of an HPM ASAT weapon on Alliance’s laser antenna meets the
imminence requirement because without an imminent U.S. action, Alliance could
carry out the attack on the U.S. satellite. 239 Furthermore, using an HPM ASAT is
necessary because temporarily disarming Alliance’s antenna neutralizes Alliance’s
means to attack the U.S. satellite. 240 Disabling Alliance’s laser antenna with an
HPM ASAT weapon is proportionate because it matches the scope of Alliance’s
attack—destroying hardware. 241 Further, even if the HPM permanently destroyed
Alliance’s antenna, the action would still be proportionate because it repulses
Alliance’s attack without injuring the inhabitants of the base. 242 Thus, the use of
an HPM ASAT weapon satisfies all of Caroline’s requirements and constitutes a
viable option for the U.S. to use in this situation.243
E. Robotic Mechanisms
Robotic mechanisms are extendable arms on a satellite that can push an
adversarial satellite out of orbit or break a specific portion off another object.244
Once a satellite is out of orbit, it cannot conduct its original function anymore and
becomes useless. 245 So, robotic mechanism ASATs could permanently destroy
adversarial satellites but to a different degree. 246 Instead of instant destruction, the
robotic mechanism pushes the satellite into a different orbit where it could crash
into other satellites, create space debris, or fade away into space. 247 If the operator

237. Id.
238. Id. at 15–16; Kania, supra note 32.
239. See generally China May Deploy Anti-Satellite Laser Weapons Next Year Able to Destroy U.S.
Military Satellites, supra note 189 (explaining that a laser antenna has the capability to destroy satellites).
240. See generally Kania, supra note 32 (articulating how an HPM can disable ASAT weapons).
241. See id. (explaining how an HPM can disable ASAT weapons).
242. See supra Part IV (clarifying that even permanently destroying the antenna does not exceed the scope
of Alliance’s planned attack).
243. See generally Kania, supra note 32 (noting that an HPM can disable ASAT weapons without harming
individuals); see also Martinez, supra note 21, at 138 (arguing that destroying weapons to counter an attack
satisfies the proportionality element).
244.
See
generally
NASIC,
COMPETING
IN
SPACE
(2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that a robotic mechanism can break a portion off another object
by initiating a collision between the robotic mechanism and the object a nation wishes to destroy).
245. See Where Do Old Satellites Go When They Die?, NASA SCI. (June 28, 2019),
https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/spacecraft-graveyard/en/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting that out-of-orbit satellites are dead and useless).
246. See generally COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 244 (explaining that a robotic mechanism can push
a satellite out of orbit, which differs from instantly destroying the satellite like a kinetic kill vehicle).
247. Where Do Old Satellites Go When They Die?, supra note 245.
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uses the robotic mechanism to break off a portion of an adversarial satellite, it
would cause instant destruction similar to a kinetic kill vehicle. 248 However, the
main difference from the previous ASAT weapons is that robotic mechanisms are
not necessarily designed to be weapons. 249 Rather, robotic mechanisms on
satellites are versatile and can accomplish a number of tasks. 250
Destroying Alliance’s laser antenna with a robotic mechanism satisfies the
imminence requirement because the laser antenna poses an imminent threat to the
U.S.251 Additionally, destroying the laser antenna is necessary because when the
robotic mechanism destroys the antenna, Alliance cannot attack the U.S.’ GPS
satellite. 252 To effectively satisfy Caroline’s proportionality element, the U.S. must
ensure the robotic mechanism only destroys the laser antenna of Alliance’s base. 253
If the robotic mechanism accidently destroys more than the antenna, there is a
possibility that the structural damage may expose the inhabitants to the hostile
conditions of space. 254 If Alliance’s roof breaks because the robotic mechanism
missed the antenna, the inhabitants will die from the extreme conditions of
space. 255 Killing the four inhabitants—even accidentally—negates an anticipatory
self-defense claim because the death of the four inhabitants is not proportional to
the loss of the GPS satellite. 256 Therefore, if the U.S. decides to preemptively strike
using a robotic mechanism, it must exercise extreme caution. 257
Based on the specific facts of the hypothetical, the U.S. should utilize either a
radiofrequency jammer or HPM to effectively neutralize Alliance’s plan to attack
the GPS satellite. 258 While the chemical sprayer meets the Caroline requirements,
the potential for error in spraying the base instead of the antenna poses too much

248. See generally First Line of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, supra note 199 (explaining that kinetic
kill vehicles collide with their intended targets—similar to an elongated robotic mechanism colliding with its
intended target).
249. See generally COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 244 (noting that the robotic mechanism is an
attachment to a satellite and utilized for any number of purposes).
250. See Robotic Gripper for Satellite Capture and Servicing, NASA TECH. TRANSFER PROGRAM,
https://technology.nasa.gov/patent/GSC-TOPS-190 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (showing that a robotic mechanism on a satellite can capture dead or out of fuel satellites).
251. See generally China May Deploy Anti-Satellite Laser Weapons Next Year Able to Destroy U.S.
Military Satellites, supra note 189 (explaining that a laser antenna has the capability to destroy satellites).
252. See generally COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 244 (explaining that collisions can destroy ASAT
weapons).
253. See supra Subsection III.B.2 (arguing that if the robotic mechanism destroys Alliance’s base, the
preemptive action may not satisfy the proportionality element).
254. See Ludacer & Anderson, supra note 207 (elaborating again that humans cannot survive in space
without specific protective equipment).
255. See id. (maintaining that humans cannot survive in space without protective equipment).
256. See generally Bonafede, supra note 110, at 175 (showing that the proportionality element requires
more than property damage to justify taking a human life).
257. See supra Subsection III.B.2 (advocating that the U.S. exercise caution because if the U.S. accidently
kills the four inhabitants, its anticipatory self-defense claim will fail, and the U.N. will condemn the U.S.’ actions).
258. See generally China May Deploy Anti-Satellite Laser Weapons Next Year Able to Destroy U.S.
Military Satellites, supra note 189 (explaining that a laser antenna can destroy satellites in space).
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of a risk in this situation. 259 Finally, the kinetic kill vehicle and robotic mechanism
are too destructive and therefore unproportionate means of repulsing Alliance’s
attack. 260 Accordingly, different situations will require different ASAT weapons
due to the fact-sensitive inquiry into each of the Caroline elements. 261 Although
the U.S. should place ASAT weapons in space, the examination of which weapons
are best will change with each arising situation. 262 Thus, the U.S. must ensure the
Space Force is dynamic in its approach to weaponizing space. 263
V. RECOMMENDING THE U.S. PLACE CERTAIN ASAT WEAPONS IN SPACE
The U.S. should place ASAT weapons in space and justify it through
anticipatory self-defense. 264 Spacefaring nations—such as China and Russia—
already boast a pro-militarized space in their current military dogma. 265 The new
Space Force will ensure the U.S. does not fall behind these spacefaring nations,
which could leave the U.S. vulnerable to unprecedented attacks. 266 However,
opponents to the pro-weaponization of space ground their argument into two main
categories: cost to taxpayers and creating a new frontier for war. 267
The Trump administration estimated the Space Force would require two billion
dollars over the period of five years. 268 This estimate is separate from the ten billion
dollars the U.S. already spends on unclassified space programs. 269 Yet these
figures represent “less than 0.05 percent of the Pentagon’s expected budget”
259. See generally Gallium v Aluminum, supra note 224 (showing that liquid gallium can trickle down the
aluminum target).
260. See First Line of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, supra note 199 (demonstrating the destructive
nature of kinetic kill vehicles); see also COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 244 (depicting how a robotic
mechanism could destroy a satellite).
261. See generally supra Subsection III.B.2.b (highlighting the intricacies of a nation’s argument when it
justifies its actions through anticipatory self-defense).
262. Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96.
263. See generally supra Subsection III.B.2.b (noticing that the Caroline elements require nations to be
careful when preemptively acting).
264. See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (identifying the hostility of China and Russia towards
the U.S. in today’s political and economic climate).
265. Id.
266. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE
9 (2021).
267. See Justin Wise, Ex-Astronaut Slams Trump’s ‘Space Force’ Proposal: Let’s Deal with Our Current
‘Cyber War’, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/400301-ex-nasa-astronautslams-trumps-space-force-proposal-lets-deal-with (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(outlining critics’ arguments regarding the pro-weaponization of space).
268. See Mike Gruss & Aaron Mehta, Space Force to Cost $2 Billion, Include 15,000 Personnel in First
Five Years, DEF. NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/03/01/space-force-to-cost-2billion-include-15000-personnel-in-first-five-years/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that the two-billion-dollar startup cost is for creating a headquarters, paying personnel, and adding
new units or organizations).
269. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CARL E. BEHRENS & DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
IB92011, U.S. SPACE PROGRAMS: CIVILIAN, MILITARY, AND COMMERCIAL (2006) (addressing some of the U.S.’
unclassified space programs); Gruss & Mehta, supra note 268.
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between 2020–2025. 270 Furthermore, the administration planned to transfer money
from other Department of Defense budgets to fund more than 95% of the Space
Force. 271 Thus, for the foreseeable future, the federal government’s creation and
employment of the Space Force will not significantly impact the national defense
budget or taxpayers. 272
Critics worry that weaponizing space will produce a new frontier for war,
rather than simply deterring conflict on Earth. 273 This argument reigns true.274
Nations like Russia and China are actively developing ASAT weapons and plan to
weaponize space with these new weapons. 275 Russia and China’s proweaponization stance threatens the safety of U.S. assets in space because the U.S.
currently employs 1,327 satellites, which are left vulnerable without adequate
protection. 276 Moreover, Russia is not hesitating to flex its space capabilities.277
On April 15, 2020, Russia tested a ground-based ASAT weapon; however, the U.S.
will not state what Russia’s target was. 278 Russia’s conduct demonstrates it is
capable of space-warfare, necessitating action from the remaining spacefaring
nations. 279 Unfortunately, the time to deter the placement of weapons in space
through treaties has passed. 280 The U.S. must prepare for the inevitable—the new
frontier of war in space. 281
Despite the need to place weapons in space, limits on which weapons nations
use should exist. 282 Due to the excessive debris in orbit, nations should—if
possible—limit their ASAT weapons to radiofrequency jammers, chemical
sprayers, and HPMs.283 These types of weapons disable adversarial satellites, but
270. Gruss & Mehta, supra note 268.
271. Id.
272. See generally id. (inferring that the Space Force costing only 0.05 percent of the Pentagon’s budget
is not an impactful amount of money to the Department of Defense or taxpayers).
273. See generally Thomas Gonzáles Roberts, Why We Should Be Worried About a War in Space, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/12/why-we-should-be-worriedabout-a-war-in-space/548507/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (opining that the world
should avoid a war in space).
274. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9 (arguing that the Space Force is
necessary due to emerging threats in space from adversarial nations).
275. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
276. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9 ; Cohen, supra note 28; UCS Satellite Database,
UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
277. Cohen, supra note 28.
278. Id.
279. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9 ; Cohen, supra note 28.
280. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9 (announcing the U.S. plan to invest in
“emerging warfighting domains such as space” indicating an implicit understanding that force has become
necessary); see also Cohen, supra note 28 (demonstrating that nations already employ ASAT weapons).
281. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9.
282. See generally Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (explaining that debris litters Earth’s orbit and nations should limit the creation of more debris).
283. Id.; supra Sections IV.B–IV.D.
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leave the satellite mainly intact. 284 Bigger objects, even disabled ones, are easier
to track and avoid due to their large size. 285 If a nation destroyed adversarial
satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle or robotic mechanism, the collision between
the weapon and satellite would create an enormous amount of debris. 286 Further,
since the collision would break the satellite into many pieces, a high possibility
exists that the collision would create microscopic debris that nations could not
track. 287 Untraceable debris creates problems for all spacefaring nations because a
microscopic particle traveling at 21,600 miles per hour can destroy satellites. 288
Therefore, to limit the creation of space debris, spacefaring nations should favor
ASAT weapons like radiofrequency jammers, HPMs, and chemical sprayers. 289
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Cold War officially ended, the space race between the U.S. and
Russia still occurs today.290 With nations like Russia and China officially stating
their desire to further militarize space, the U.S. must prepare itself for war in
space. 291 Two treaties attempted to prevent a weaponized space—the OST and the
UN Charter. 292 However, vague descriptions in the OST and the customary
international law of anticipatory self-defense allows nations to actively place
ASAT weapons in space. 293 To protect itself, the U.S. should rely on Article 51 of
the UN Charter (i.e., anticipatory self-defense) to preemptively strike if
information reveals three elements: necessity, proportionality, and imminence. 294
Spacefaring nations are developing ASAT weapons, which they can use by
invoking anticipatory self-defense. 295 The most probable ASAT weapons that

284. See generally DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (highlighting the capabilities of a variety
of ASAT weapons).
285. See Garcia, supra note 282 (arguing that the size of debris makes a difference in tracking).
286. Danger: Orbital Debris, AEROSPACE (May 4, 2018), https://aerospace.org/article/danger-orbitaldebris (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
287. See id. (explaining that some collision-created debris is so microscopic that it cannot be tracked).
288. Id.
289. See generally id. (arguing that destruction of satellites creates space debris).
290. See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (noting that the U.S. and Russia still routinely
develop ASAT weapons for use in space).
291. Id.
292. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 18, at art. 4; see U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (noting the
treaty’s ban on the threat or use of force).
293. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 18, at art. 4; see U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 2, ¶ 4
(reiterating that the U.N. Charter incorporates customary international law); supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
294. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (noting that the U.N. Charter allows for a nation to attack in self-defense);
Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96; supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
295. See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10 (showing the types of ASAT weapons different
nations are building); see also supra Subsection III.B.2.b (highlighting the customary international law’s
interpretation of anticipatory self-defense).
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nations employ today are: kinetic kill vehicles, radiofrequency jammers, chemical
sprayers, HPMs, and robotic mechanisms. 296 The hypothetical in this Comment
provided a situation which tested a potential scenario where the U.S. could deploy
some ASAT weapons, but not others. 297 Satisfying the Caroline elements to invoke
anticipatory self-defense requires a dynamic, fact-specific inquiry that will change
with each situation. 298 Consequently, some situations will necessitate the
destructive nature of kinetic kill vehicles, while others will require the temporary
solutions from radiofrequency jammers. 299
Based on China and Russia’s pro-weaponization stance, the U.S. should
employ ASAT weapons in space. 300 Further—when possible—the U.S. should
avoid the collision-based ASAT weapons because the collision in space will create
space debris, which already overcrowds Earth’s orbit. 301 The Space Force will
ensure the U.S. remains a dominant nation in space. 302
Space is an extremely dangerous yet prosperous area of the universe. 303 The
prosperity, unfortunately, leads to conflicts among nations that sparks a race for
dominance. 304 Today’s technology, although advanced, is still decades away from
the weapons imagined in Star Wars. 305 While X-wing Starfighters are not flying
through space destroying Death Stars, today’s technology is advancing in that
direction. 306

296. COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 244.
297. See supra Part IV (postulating that in the hypothetical scenario where the U.S. was threatened by
Alliance, the U.S. could deploy certain weapons like radiofrequency jammers, HPMs, and chemical sprayers).
298. Van den hole, supra note 89, at 96.
299. See generally id. (arguing that the fact-specific nature of proving necessity, proportionality, and
imminence will allow some ASAT weapons to pass the test while others will fail).
300. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 10.
301. See Garcia, supra note 282 (“The greatest risk to space missions comes from non-trackable debris.”).
302. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 266, at 9.
303. See Kashyap Vyas, Mining in Space: What It Means for the Economy?, INTERESTING ENGINEERING
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/mining-in-space-what-it-means-for-the-economy (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that space mining is a lucrative future business).
304. Id.
305. US Creates Space Force, with Eye on Star Wars-like Future, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 22, 2019),
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/us-creates-space-force-with-eye-on-star-wars-like-future (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
306. Id.
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